Bangladesh’s Strategic Shift: Pakistan Partnership and the Fallout with India

The Yunus-led interim government in Bangladesh is altering the country’s geopolitical orientation in ways that challenge its historical alliances and the foundational principles of its Liberation War. This realignment, characterized by a surprising warmth toward Pakistan, raises significant questions about Bangladesh’s future as a regional player and its commitment to the legacy of its 1971 independence struggle. For India, this shift signals not only the loss of a strategic partner but also the erosion of a hard-won regional balance.

Since the ousting of Sheikh Hasina on August 5, Bangladesh has seen an ideological shift that goes beyond mere political change. Hasina’s administration had positioned Bangladesh as a reliable partner for India, offering stability, economic growth, and cooperation in countering cross-border extremism. During her tenure, bilateral trade with India grew to $16 billion annually, while strategic projects like the Maitree Power Plant and the Padma Bridge underscored Dhaka’s commitment to shared development goals. Her leadership also curbed Islamist extremism, providing regional security benefits that aligned with India’s interests.

The interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, however, is pivoting in a different direction. A striking example of this shift is the arrival of a direct Pakistani cargo ship at Chittagong Port in November, the first such instance in over five decades. Previously, trade between the two countries relied on third-party ports like Singapore, making the development economically significant. Pakistani exports to Bangladesh reached $800 million in 2023, and the direct trade route promises to expand this further. Diplomatically, the move signals Dhaka’s willingness to recalibrate its relationship with Islamabad.

Pakistan has been quick to capitalize on the leadership transition in Dhaka. High Commissioner Syed Ahmed Maroof described the docking as “a step toward greater regional integration,” reflecting Islamabad’s broader ambitions to weaken India’s regional influence. Visa restrictions for Pakistani nationals have also been relaxed, and direct flights between Dhaka and Islamabad are set to resume. For India, this is not merely a bilateral concern but a broader regional challenge, particularly as Islamist factions in Bangladesh gain prominence under the interim administration.

The Yunus government’s alignment with Pakistan also reflects a disturbing revision of Bangladesh’s historical narrative. Key national days tied to the Liberation War, such as March 7 and August 15, have been canceled. These days commemorate Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s iconic speech rallying the nation for independence and the anniversary of his assassination, respectively. Their removal is widely seen as an attempt to diminish Mujib’s centrality in Bangladesh’s founding.

The ideological shift extends beyond symbolism. Reports indicate growing marginalization of Hindu minorities, with attacks on religious leaders and institutions raising fears of a refugee crisis that could spill over into India. Indian intelligence agencies are also concerned that relaxed Pakistani visa policies may facilitate the entry of hostile operatives, posing direct threats to regional security.

This realignment poses significant risks for Bangladesh. Pakistan’s overtures come at a time when Dhaka is increasingly aligning with China, raising the specter of a Beijing-Islamabad-Dhaka axis. While this may offer short-term economic gains, such as trade diversification and infrastructure investments, it risks alienating India—a partner that accounts for over 15% of Bangladesh’s total trade and provides critical development assistance.

India’s measured response reflects its long-term confidence in the cultural, economic, and historical ties binding the two nations. Yet, New Delhi cannot afford complacency. As Dhaka tilts toward Islamabad, the BJP-led government faces growing domestic pressure to act, especially as concerns mount over the treatment of Hindus in Bangladesh.

The actions and policies under Yunus’s administration, as outlined, could have significant implications for the security balance in South Asia. Bangladesh, as a key player in the region, has historically maintained a cautious stance toward Pakistan, rooted in the atrocities of 1971 and the unresolved issues of justice and accountability. Any deviation from this approach not only alters the dynamics between these two nations but also reverberates across the broader South Asian geopolitical landscape.

1. Strategic Realignment and Regional Stability:
   By softening its stance toward Pakistan and allowing measures like visa-free travel and resumed direct flights, Bangladesh under Yunus’s interim government risks signaling a strategic realignment. Such moves could embolden Pakistan’s influence in the region, potentially upsetting the delicate balance of power among South Asian nations. Neighboring India, for instance, might perceive this shift as a threat to its own strategic interests, given the historical ties and cooperation between India and Bangladesh since the Liberation War.
2. Potential Exploitation by External Powers:
   A more conciliatory Bangladesh-Pakistan relationship could create opportunities for external powers, such as China, to deepen their influence in the region. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh are significant players in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and closer ties between them could facilitate greater Chinese strategic leverage in South Asia. This could complicate the existing power dynamics and alliances, particularly with India and the United States, both of which have vested interests in the region’s stability.
3. Erosion of Justice and Historical Accountability:
   A shift in Bangladesh’s approach to Pakistan undercuts the justice and accountability narrative that has long been a cornerstone of its post-1971 identity. This ideological departure risks not only alienating sections of the Bangladeshi populace who remain deeply connected to the Liberation War’s legacy but also setting a precedent for other nations in the region to deprioritize historical grievances in favor of immediate political expediency.
4. Encouragement of Radical Elements:
   A perceived rapprochement with Pakistan could embolden radical elements within Bangladesh that have historically aligned with ideologies sympathetic to Pakistan. This could lead to internal unrest, threatening Bangladesh’s own security and creating a ripple effect across South Asia, where extremist networks often operate transnationally.
5. Weakened Diplomatic Position in Regional Forums:
   Bangladesh’s pivot toward a more accommodating stance on Pakistan could dilute its moral authority in regional and international forums where it has long advocated for justice and historical recognition of the Liberation War. This shift may reduce its leverage in negotiating regional cooperation and security frameworks.

In conclusion, Yunus’s policies, particularly those fostering closer ties with Pakistan, risk undermining South Asia’s fragile security equilibrium. They challenge the established norms of accountability and justice that have defined Bangladesh’s stance, potentially reshaping the region’s power dynamics and creating new uncertainties in an already volatile geopolitical environment.