In the complex and evolving political landscape of Bangladesh, Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus has assumed a central—yet increasingly controversial—role. As Chief Advisor of the current interim regime, Yunus is widely perceived to be orchestrating a deliberate delay in holding national elections, driven not by concern for democratic integrity, but by a calculated desire to entrench power through non-electoral means. His hesitation, critics argue, stems from a deep fear of political irrelevance, legal accountability, and the diminishing legitimacy of his long-cultivated global image.
Power without Mandate: The Core of the Crisis
Dr. Yunus, having secured the position of Chief Advisor through an opaque and politically contentious process following the ouster of the Awami League government, now presides over a regime that lacks electoral legitimacy. Instead of steering the country toward a timely democratic transition, his government appears increasingly committed to maintaining control without the mandate of the people.
Central to this strategy has been the establishment and backing of a blossoming political party, comprised largely of his young student apprentices —many of whom have already been implicated in corruption of millions of dollars and administrative misconduct. This political formation, viewed by many as a proxy for Yunus’s personal ambitions, has only added to the growing distrust surrounding his leadership.
A Politically Manufactured Stalemate
While abroad in Japan, Yunus recently told the Nikkei Forum that “only one party wants the election in December,” adding that polls would take place between December and June, and that his government would not remain in power “a day beyond June.” But this declaration is far from reassuring. Instead, it has reinforced suspicions that Yunus is intentionally fostering an artificial political vacuum—one that delays elections under the pretext of reforms while positioning himself as an indispensable transitional figure.
This delay strategy is increasingly at odds with the growing chorus of domestic voices demanding elections by December 2025. At least ten registered political parties, including the main opposition BNP, have insisted on this timeline. Among them, four have specifically requested a clear electoral roadmap, while six religiously aligned parties are emphasizing structural reforms prior to elections. Even former allies of the now-suspended Awami League, such as the Jatiya Party, are calling for an early vote. Numerous unregistered parties aligned with the 12-party BNP alliance have echoed these demands.
Notably, Yunus is not unchallenged from within the system. Meanwhile, only Yunus and his inner circle appear opposed to an immediate election. As BNP Standing Committee member Mirza Abbas pointedly noted, “The only person who doesn’t [want elections] is Professor Yunus.”
Over the whole situation, a Bangladeshi media report mentioned, “When asked about the Chief Advisor’s remarks, several advisors of the present regime were approached for comments. One of them, speaking on condition of anonymity, said, “The election will be held sometime between December and June—not a day later. Despite this assurance, it’s only the BNP that is insisting the election must take place by December. They don’t talk about reforms; all they want is the election. But the government’s responsibility isn’t just to hold elections—it also includes reforms and ensuring justice.”
The advisor added, “We don’t want to hand over power to any party without implementing reforms. All other parties are calling for reforms before the election—only the BNP is fixated solely on the vote.”
Institutional Decay and Fear of Accountability
One of the most significant reasons behind Yunus’s reluctance to facilitate elections lies in the interim regime’s declining popularity and increasing allegations of corruption. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) has launched investigations into several high-ranking officials close to the regime, including a former Assistant Private Secretary (APS), personal officers of advisers, and Gazi Sahlahuddin Tanvir, a former joint secretary of the Yunus-backed National Citizen Party (NCP). These inquiries suggest that deep-rooted corruption has severely damaged the credibility of the interim government.
As a result, holding elections—particularly free and fair ones—could open the door to accountability, both political and legal. There is widespread concern that Yunus and his close associates could face trial or at least public censure once a new government assumes power. Hence, avoiding elections becomes a matter of political survival.
Global Optics vs. Local Realities
Yunus’s international reputation as the pioneer of microcredit and founder of Grameen Bank has often shielded him from criticism. However, within Bangladesh, that halo has long since faded. He is no longer seen merely as a benevolent economist but as an actor entangled in tax waivers, financial irregularities, and labor disputes. His organization Grameen Bank reportedly benefitted from tax waivers amounting to approximately $60 million, raising ethical questions about his entanglement with both public finances and political actors.
Furthermore, Yunus’s current strategy closely mirrors past attempts to establish “caretaker” governments in Bangladesh. But while earlier models aimed to ensure neutral elections, this version appears far more authoritarian in nature—relying on foreign lobbies, NGO networks, and international media campaigns to discredit political rivals rather than foster electoral participation.
His recent rhetoric—frequently amplified in Western forums—portrays Bangladesh as a democracy in decline, yet he offers no concrete roadmap for resolving the crisis through democratic or electoral means. Notably, he remains silent on the BNP’s internal disarray and the contentious legacy of Jamaat-e-Islami, both of which have historically aligned with him. Indeed, Yunus appears to be closely backed by Jamaat-e-Islami. This selective critique underscores a troubling pattern: in Yunus’s narrative, only an opposition that excludes the Awami League is deemed legitimate.
Judiciary and Media as Political Instruments
Perhaps most concerning is the strategic use of Bangladesh’s judiciary and media apparatus to legitimize the regime’s extended rule. A spate of court verdicts, NGO-led media trials, and carefully curated foreign policy statements indicate a coordinated effort to depict Yunus not as an aspiring autocrat but as a victim of state persecution. This victimhood narrative conveniently distracts from mounting allegations against him, including financial misconduct and labor law violations.
Rather than embracing transparency, Yunus has opted to wage legal battles in international arenas—thereby attempting to internationalize what remains a deeply national political crisis. His international legal lobbying, including cases filed in global courts and appeals to foreign governments, signals an effort to circumvent domestic accountability mechanisms.
The Military’s Diverging Stance
Bangladesh’s military leadership, including Chief of Army Staff General Waker-uz-Zaman, has publicly supported the call for general elections to be held by December. This growing civil-military divergence underscores the fragile balance on which the Yunus-led interim regime rests.
Military support has historically been a pivotal factor in the success or failure of transitional governments in Bangladesh. Should the military decisively break from the Yunus strategy, the regime’s survival—already contingent on delay tactics—could face a sudden collapse.
The Political Endgame: Replacing Democracy with Technocracy
Ultimately, Yunus’s endgame appears to be the replacement of democratic mandates with technocratic governance. By sidelining political parties, delaying elections, and empowering unelected legal, bureaucratic, and civil society actors, he is attempting to usher in a political order where decisions are made in conference rooms rather than ballot boxes.
This governance model is attractive to a certain class of international actors—particularly Western human rights groups and global finance institutions—that value stability and elite consensus over messy electoral politics. But for Bangladeshis, who have fought long and hard for democratic self-determination, this model reeks of paternalism and neocolonial influence.
The People Are Watching
Despite media narratives and elite maneuvering, public sentiment in Bangladesh remains strongly aligned with the idea of elections. Ordinary citizens, weary of Dr. Yunus’s power games, NGO politics, and bureaucratic overreach, increasingly seek legitimacy through the ballot. The longer Yunus delays elections, the more he risks alienating a population already skeptical of his motives.
In a country where democracy has endured coups, assassinations, and deep political fissures, it is ultimately the people who hold the key to legitimacy. And they are watching—with increasing impatience.
Conclusion
Dr. Muhammad Yunus’s reluctance to facilitate elections is not rooted in a desire for reform or democratic improvement. It is, rather, a deliberate effort to maintain power through non-electoral means, by capitalizing on international goodwill, suppressing domestic opposition with his young students muscle forces in the name of Mob-Trial, and manipulating judicial instruments. His tactics may prolong his regime’s survival, but they also risk further destabilizing a country already on edge.
As Bangladesh navigates this precarious moment, the call for elections is not just a procedural demand—it is a reaffirmation of the people’s right to choose their future. No amount of Nobel credentials or global advocacy can substitute for that fundamental democratic right.
