By Sheikh Mohammad Fauzul Mubin
Editor, PressXpress

Bangladesh is now living inside a contradiction that can no longer be managed with public relations.

On the one hand, the Bangladesh Army is publicly positioning itself as a stabilising, neutral institution. On the other hand, verifiable incidents, timestamped live footage, and credible reporting show actions that look increasingly selective—intervening where it should not, and arriving late where it should have prevented escalation.

This is not a matter of “opinion.” It is measurable: dates, times, casualty counts, troop deployment plans, and documented incidents.

The question is simple:
Is the Army protecting the Republic—or managing politics?

1) The Nikunja Newsroom Pickup: Documented Time, Footage, and an Army Camp

On Saturday night, 7 February 2026, army personnel entered the Bangladesh Times office in Nikunja, Dhaka and “picked up” 21 journalists and staff, according to multiple local reports. The incident was reported to have occurred around 9:30 PM.

A live video streamed on the outlet’s Facebook page at about 11:30 PM showed the 21 staff members returning after being taken to an army camp, according to both The Daily Star and New Age.

New Age reported they were taken to an army camp in Uttara, Dhaka.

Even if everyone was released, the question remains:
Under what written authority does an army unit take working journalists from a newsroom at night?

A newsroom is not a battlefield. If there is an allegation, constitutional states use:
documented complaint → warrant/notice → counsel access → court oversight.
“Picked up” is not a legal standard. It is a coercive standard.

2) The Press Was “Rescued” After It Was Burned: Evidence of Capability—and a Deeper Contradiction

On 18–19 December 2025, mobs attacked and set fire to the offices of Prothom Alo and The Daily Star, halting printing presses in an unprecedented attack on Bangladeshi media.

Reuters reported journalists were trapped for hours and were rescued by military forces as smoke engulfed the buildings.

So here is the contradiction the nation cannot ignore:

• The Army can rescue journalists when mobs trap them.
• Yet the Army also allegedly takes journalists from their office to a camp at night.

This is not “neutrality.”
This looks like a system where the press is protected only after it is attacked—but is also disciplined when it publishes content that triggers powerful institutions.

A free press cannot survive on rescue operations. It survives on preventive protection + lawful limits + institutional restraint.

3) “Neutral Election” + 100,000 Troops: A Democracy Cannot Be “Ensured” by Troop Numbers

Bangladesh is heading into an election environment described by severe legitimacy concerns. Al Jazeera’s January 29, 2026 analysis notes the military remains a potent force shaping politics behind the scenes.

Now add hard numbers:

The Business Standard reported Bangladesh will deploy “1 lakh” (100,000) army personnel nationwide for the February 2026 polls—far higher than 40,000–42,000 used in the 2024 election—along with 544 camps and about 5,000 patrols.

Meanwhile, public statements from the Army Chief emphasize “neutrality,” “professionalism,” “impartiality,” and “citizen-friendly behavior” during election duties.

Read that again:
Neutrality is being narrated while force density is being expanded to historic levels.

This is the mismatch:

• Neutral elections are produced by competitive participation + equal rights + trust.
• Securitized elections are produced by troops + camps + patrols.

A democracy does not need 100,000 soldiers to prove neutrality.
A fragile system does.

4) Inquilab Mancha Unrest: Where Restraint Was Needed, Force Became the Default

After the death of youth leader Sharif Osman Hadi (Inquilab Mancha spokesperson), nationwide unrest erupted. Reuters reported violent protests spread to major cities and that the interim government struggled to control the situation.

AP also reported that protests escalated into attacks on media and cultural institutions.

This matters because the public has watched a pattern:

• Harsh enforcement against protest and expression in some instances.
• Delayed prevention when mobs become violent in others.

A democracy requires one discipline: proportionality.
A coercive state requires none.

5) “Intervene Where You Shouldn’t, Delay Where You Must”: The Evidence Pattern

Let’s put the pattern in evidence terms:

Where intervention appears excessive or constitutionally questionable

• Bangladesh Times newsroom: 21 staff taken to an army camp at night; live video shows return.

Where intervention came after major damage

• Prothom Alo & Daily Star offices attacked and torched; journalists trapped and later rescued by military.

Where mobs broke through barricades and attacked institutions

• Daily Star reported that on 19 Dec 2025, a mob of 100–150 attacked Chhayanaut Bhaban around 2:00 AM, breaking through police barricades and entering the cultural institution.

These are not “random lives.” These are reported incidents with specific times, crowd estimates, and consequences.

6) The Most Dangerous Mismatch: Words of Neutrality, Optics of Selectivity

Public messaging says:

• “Neutrality,” “professionalism,” “impartial election duty.”

Observable reality shows:

• Night newsroom pickup of journalists to an army camp.
• Mass troop deployment plan for elections (100,000), with camps/patrols.

When words and actions diverge, the public concludes one thing: bias.

And bias inside the armed forces is not a political argument. It is a national-security risk—because once a force is perceived as selective, it loses the single asset that keeps countries stable: legitimacy.

7) A Hard, Factual Bottom Line

Bangladesh is witnessing a historic institutional stress test.

If the Army wants to preserve its credibility, it must return to one standard:

• No newsroom pickups without transparent legal process.
• No securitized “neutrality” where troop numbers replace democratic consent.
• No selective silence when mobs attack institutions and the press.

Democracy cannot be defended by intimidation.
It can only be defended by equal protection under law.

And if Bangladesh’s institutions continue to treat journalism as a security variable and elections as a military operation, the country will not move toward stability—it will move toward a future where force replaces consent, and fear replaces citizenship.

That is not reform.
That is national decay.