The investigation into the 10 November Red Fort explosion in New Delhi has opened a troubling window into the evolving architecture of militancy in South Asia. While Bangladesh’s interim government has vehemently dismissed Indian media reports and rejected any claims that its territory was used to facilitate the attack, Indian security agencies insist that a complex web of extremist collaborations stretching across Pakistan, Bangladesh, and eastern India has begun to surface.
This growing body of evidence, whether ultimately conclusive or not, paints a disturbing picture: dormant extremist networks in Bangladesh may be reorganizing, reconnecting, and crossing borders at a moment of deep political fragility in Dhaka.
At the heart of the Indian investigation lies an unpublicized, high stakes meeting held in Dhaka’s upscale Banani area in the final week of October. According to Indian agencies, the meeting took place only days before the Red Fort explosion, bringing together an unusual mix of actors: seasoned militants, extremist ideologues, explosives experts, and, most alarmingly, individuals holding official positions within Bangladesh’s interim government. Lashkar e Taiba’s Pakistan based senior commander Saifullah Saif reportedly joined virtually, addressing leaders of Hizbut Tahrir, figures from Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith, operatives of Ansarullah Bangla Team, and specialists believed to be trained in explosives handling. Saif allegedly issued operational guidance for attacks inside India and outlined the support mechanisms Lashkar e Taiba would provide.
The presence of two Bangladeshi government officials a serving Home Secretary and a top city corporation executive has stunned security analysts. If confirmed, the development would not necessarily indicate state complicity, but rather a more insidious phenomenon: ideological penetration of extremist groups into bureaucratic or administrative structures.
Bangladesh’s potential entanglement in renewed regional extremism does not emerge from a vacuum. Over the past two decades, groups such as Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh, Hizbut Tahrir, and Ansarullah Bangla Team have risen, fragmented, and reconfigured. Despite major crackdowns, particularly after the Holey Artisan attack in 2016, many of these networks adapted, dispersing across campuses, mosques, online recruitment hubs, and border communities. Indian agencies have long tracked ideological and logistical linkages between Bangladesh based operatives and Pakistan based outfits like Lashkar e Taiba. The current investigation suggests not the birth of a new ecosystem but the reactivation of an older one, revitalized by digital tools, shifting geopolitical alignments, and vulnerabilities created by political transition.
The operational trail pursued by Indian investigators leads to Murshidabad, a district historically used as a gateway for cross border militants operating between Bangladesh and India. Days after the Dhaka meeting, a team of explosives specialists allegedly entered India through Murshidabad after crossing from Rajshahi. Their movement followed the traditional smuggling channels long exploited for arms, narcotics, human trafficking, and extremist mobility. Reports indicate that they were sheltered in a safe house owned by a Bangladeshi national named Iktiar, a fugitive wanted in connection with the killing of an intelligence officer in Bangladesh. Murshidabad’s riverine terrain and porous border have made it an operational corridor for groups like Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh and Ansarullah Bangla Team for decades. Its reappearance in the present investigation underscores a stubborn reality: geography continues to grant militants mobility even when politics tries to restrict it.
Indian agencies also claim that certain supplies originating from Pakistan entered West Bengal shortly before the blast and may have formed part of the attack infrastructure. If verified, this would signal the revival of a triangular militant pipeline linking Pakistan based planners, Bangladesh based intermediaries, and India based executors, echoing patterns from the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Statements by Lashkar commander Saifullah Saif at a public gathering in Pakistan shortly before the blast add another layer of provocation. He boasted that Hafiz Saeed’s trusted operatives were active inside Bangladesh and preparing operations targeting India, declaring that Bangladesh was “moving closer to Pakistan.” Whether propaganda or coded signalling, the timing has drawn the attention of investigators.
Bangladesh’s interim government has strongly rejected these allegations. Foreign Affairs Adviser Md. Touhid Hossain dismissed the Indian media reports as baseless and reaffirmed that Bangladesh’s territory is not and will not be used for activities against India. Dhaka has long emphasized its commitment to counterterrorism and has cooperated closely with Indian agencies to dismantle trans border extremist networks. This emphasis on partnership aligns with Bangladesh’s longstanding position that stability, not confrontation, serves regional interests best.
The current situation, however, is delicate. India is not accusing the Bangladeshi state of orchestrating the attack. Rather, its agencies point to extremist organizations operating inside Bangladesh and, potentially, individual actors within the interim administration whose ideological leanings may have overridden institutional duties. This distinction is politically significant but diplomatically volatile. If the investigation intensifies and evidence solidifies, Dhaka and Delhi may find themselves navigating a tense balance between security cooperation and political sensitivity.
What emerges from the early stages of the Delhi blast investigation is a portrait of an extremist network that has not disappeared but shifted form. Bangladesh’s long battle against militancy has yielded major successes, yet ideological pockets persist, and the possibility of isolated infiltration into state structures remains a serious challenge. For India, the allegations demand precise intelligence evaluation rather than sweeping conclusions. For Bangladesh, the moment calls for internal vigilance, institutional introspection, and an unbroken commitment to ensuring that no individual or group can exploit political transition for extremist ends.
The Delhi blast may ultimately become either a confirmed example of cross border extremist coordination or a case study in the complexities of intelligence interpretation. Either way, the signals are unsettling. Old networks may be stirring. Regional militant corridors may be reopening. And the delicate equilibrium between Bangladesh’s political environment and its counterterrorism posture may be entering one of its sternest tests in recent years.
If Indian agencies continue to uncover evidence, real or perceived, Bangladesh’s interim government should prepare for a harder line from New Delhi. This could come in the form of increased security pressure, stronger intelligence demands, and closer diplomatic scrutiny. Dhaka will need to respond with transparency, firmness, and proactive counter extremism measures to prevent the narrative from hardening against it at a sensitive moment in regional politics.
