With Donald Trump back in the White House, Cambodia is recalibrating its approach to Washington, seeking a more pragmatic and mutually beneficial relationship. As a small state often overshadowed by its larger neighbors, Phnom Penh is making it clear that it does not want to be a mere pawn in the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. Instead, it has a strategic wishlist for the new administration—one that prioritizes economic cooperation, security engagement, and diplomatic respect. The key question is whether Trump’s foreign policy will align with Cambodia’s ambitions or sideline it once again.
A Push for a More Nuanced U.S.-Cambodia Relationship
Cambodia’s ties with Washington have long been defined by cycles of engagement and estrangement, largely due to Phnom Penh’s deep alignment with Beijing and its contentious human rights record. However, with Prime Minister Hun Manet at the helm since 2023, there have been signs of a diplomatic thaw. Now, Cambodia is hoping Trump 2.0 will capitalize on this momentum rather than revert to old confrontational policies.
At the top of Phnom Penh’s wishlist is a shift in how the U.S. perceives Cambodia. For too long, Washington has viewed the country either as a client state of China or as an autocratic outlier. Cambodia is pushing for a recognition of its strategic balancing act—one that seeks to reduce overdependence on any single power while maximizing its geopolitical and economic options.
To that end, Cambodia is looking for U.S. support in key areas: infrastructure development, digital transformation, and trade diversification. Strengthening economic ties with Washington would allow Phnom Penh to hedge against excessive reliance on China, but without alienating its biggest economic partner.
On security, Cambodia is looking to modernize its maritime capabilities and defense structures. Unlike Vietnam or the Philippines, Cambodia lacks the military weight to engage in direct security posturing against China. Instead, it is employing a strategy of diplomatic maneuvering and selective alignment—signaling openness to broader security partnerships while avoiding overt confrontation with Beijing.
Pragmatism Over Ideology
One of Cambodia’s clearest expectations for the Trump administration is a shift toward pragmatic engagement rather than ideological confrontation. Phnom Penh has little interest in U.S. pressure on democracy and human rights—topics that have historically strained relations and pushed Cambodia closer to China.
The Biden administration’s suspension of USAID funding had already highlighted the risks of relying too heavily on Western aid, prompting Cambodia to reassess its foreign partnerships. Trump’s transactional foreign policy approach, if applied correctly, could create openings for greater U.S. involvement in Cambodia’s digital economy, technology infrastructure, and cybersecurity development.
Maritime security is another area where Cambodia is signaling willingness to collaborate. The Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand has been a flashpoint in U.S.-Cambodia relations, with Washington accusing Phnom Penh of secretly granting China exclusive access. However, in a strategic move to counter this perception, former Prime Minister Hun Sen assured Japan that its Maritime Self-Defense Force would be the first to dock at Ream once construction is completed. By positioning Japan as an intermediary, Cambodia is signaling to Washington that it remains open to security partnerships—so long as they are framed as pragmatic cooperation rather than anti-China alignment.
If the Trump administration takes a flexible approach, it could use these signals to expand its security footprint in Cambodia. Given Washington’s close defense ties with Tokyo, the U.S. could leverage Japan’s role to engage Phnom Penh without forcing it into an outright strategic shift away from Beijing.
Bridging the Democracy Divide
Despite Cambodia’s push for pragmatic engagement, democracy and human rights remain a major sticking point. Under Trump’s new administration, this friction may escalate further, particularly with Marco Rubio—a longtime critic of Cambodia’s leadership—appointed as Secretary of State.
Cambodia, however, is advocating for a policy based on “mutual respect and understanding.” The U.S. approach to Vietnam is frequently cited by Cambodian policymakers as an example of how Washington could engage without ideological confrontations. Despite Vietnam’s one-party rule and its close economic ties with China, the U.S. upgraded its relationship with Hanoi to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2024. Cambodian officials argue that a similar approach should be applied to Phnom Penh—one that respects its need for strategic flexibility rather than pushing it into a binary geopolitical choice.
Washington’s approach to Cambodia-China relations will also be closely watched. While U.S. policymakers often frame Cambodia’s ties with Beijing as a deliberate geopolitical choice, Phnom Penh insists that its relationship with China is rooted in economic necessity rather than ideology. China remains Cambodia’s largest investor and an economic lifeline, helping sustain the ruling Cambodian People’s Party’s political legitimacy.
By acknowledging Cambodia’s need for balanced relations, rather than forcing it to choose sides, the U.S. could build a more sustainable partnership. This would mirror the way Washington engages with Vietnam—recognizing its economic ties with China while strengthening U.S.-Vietnam strategic cooperation in ways that serve mutual interests.
Avoiding Collateral Damage in Great Power Competition
Ultimately, Cambodia’s message to Washington is clear: aggressive U.S. containment strategies toward China should not come at the expense of smaller states. Phnom Penh does not seek to challenge U.S. policy toward Beijing but wants to ensure that it does not suffer collateral damage in the process.
Southeast Asian nations, including Cambodia, are increasingly asserting their agency in great power competition. The region is no longer content to be a passive battleground for U.S.-China rivalry; instead, it is recalibrating its relationships to maximize strategic flexibility.
For Washington, this means rethinking its Indo-Pacific strategy. If the Trump administration wants to maintain relevance in Cambodia and the broader region, it must offer long-term economic incentives, infrastructure investments, and security partnerships tailored to regional realities. Otherwise, it risks ceding ground entirely to Beijing—further solidifying China’s dominance in a region that Washington can’t afford to lose.
