Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is pursuing a complicated strategy in dealing with the country’s Kurdish issue. While making overtures to Kurdish leaders within Turkey, his government continues to back militias fighting Kurdish groups in neighboring Syria. This dual approach has left many wondering whether Erdogan’s actions reflect genuine reconciliation efforts or calculated political maneuvering.
A New Tone at Home
Erdogan’s recent New Year’s speech emphasized a vision for a Turkey without terrorism, echoing the government’s recent outreach to the Kurdish population. This shift has been bolstered by his coalition partner Devlet Bahceli, leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), who stunned observers by softening his stance on pro-Kurdish politicians.
Bahceli, long a fierce critic of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), once labeled them an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Now, he has met with DEM representatives, even floating the idea of releasing PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in exchange for disbanding the organization. Ocalan, imprisoned since 1999, has hinted at a willingness to support reconciliation, stating he could “positively contribute” to a new peace process.
While some Kurdish leaders have expressed cautious optimism, many see the government’s outreach as a pragmatic attempt to secure political gains. Erdogan faces mounting economic and political challenges, and his coalition lacks the parliamentary majority needed to amend the constitution or call early elections. Securing support from DEM’s 57 parliamentary seats could tip the balance.
The Kurdish Vote and Political Calculations
Kurdish voters, estimated to make up 15-20% of Turkey’s population, have played a critical role in past elections. Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has struggled to win over this bloc, with many Kurds now favoring opposition candidates.
“The Erdogan system is in a major political and economic crisis,” says Berk Esen, a political scientist at Sabanci University. “The ruling alliance had to do something to stop the downward spiral, especially after losing key local elections in 2023.”
Erdogan’s overtures to the Kurdish population are seen by some as a desperate attempt to rebuild bridges and secure political survival.
A Contrasting Approach Abroad
While Erdogan speaks of reconciliation at home, his government maintains a hardline stance against Kurdish groups across the border in Syria. Turkish-backed militias continue to clash with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Ankara views as an offshoot of the PKK and a threat to its territorial integrity.
The situation is further complicated by the YPG’s alliance with the United States, which has supported the group in the fight against ISIL. Despite Turkey’s demands for the YPG to disarm, analysts say this is unlikely. “The YPG has established itself as a power in northeastern Syria,” notes Esen. “They are not going to lay down their arms after years of conflict.”
This hardline approach underscores the complexity of Erdogan’s Kurdish strategy. While attempting to win over Kurdish voters domestically, Turkey’s actions in Syria risk alienating Kurdish leaders and communities, both at home and abroad.
History of Failed Attempts
Erdogan’s latest push for reconciliation is not without precedent. Over the years, Turkey has initiated several peace processes with the Kurdish population, often promising reforms and greater autonomy. These efforts, however, have repeatedly collapsed, often amid renewed violence and a lack of trust.
In 2009, the “Democratic Initiative” (or “Kurdish Opening”) was introduced, allowing Kurdish-language broadcasts and the restoration of Kurdish town names. This led to the establishment of TRT Kurdî, a state-run Kurdish-language television channel, and elective Kurdish language courses in public schools. From 2013 to 2015, the government engaged in peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), during which PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan declared a ceasefire. However, the peace process collapsed in 2015, leading to renewed violence.
Erdogan’s current efforts also incorporate economic strategies aimed at addressing regional disparities. In December 2024, Turkey announced a $14 billion regional development plan targeting the predominantly Kurdish southeast with 198 infrastructure and development projects designed to boost GDP per capita. This initiative reflects a broader attempt to combine economic investment with reconciliation efforts.
However, political scientist Deniz Yildirim warns against premature optimism. “Turkey must solve this issue through peaceful means,” he says. “But expecting meaningful progress in a time of growing authoritarianism and shrinking freedoms is unrealistic.”
What’s Next?
Erdogan’s dual strategy reflects the intricate dynamics of the Kurdish issue, blending domestic political needs with regional security concerns. At home, his outreach to Kurdish leaders may provide short-term political gains, but skepticism remains over the sincerity and durability of these efforts. In Syria, Turkey’s continued military actions against Kurdish forces suggest little room for compromise.
As Erdogan navigates these complexities, one question looms large: can his approach bring lasting peace to Turkey’s Kurdish issue, or is it simply a calculated move to secure his political future? For now, the answer remains uncertain, and the stakes—both for Turkey and the region—could not be higher.
