Key Highlights:
- Moscow and Pyongyang unveiled a fresh defense pact
- General Mark Milley, then-chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that North Korea is likely to provide Soviet-era 152 mm artillery rounds
- Having failed twice to launch a military reconnaissance satellite into orbit this year, Kim Jong-un may seek Russian expertise in this area
Putin concluded his two-day visit to North Korea on June 23, 2024, with the unexpected signing of a new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. This marks a rare international trip for Putin, who has largely restricted his travel to allied nations since the onset of the full-scale invasion and subsequent international criminal court warrant related to the mass deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.
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Moscow and Pyongyang unveiled a fresh defense pact, which includes provisions for ‘mutual assistance in the event of aggression against either party’, according to Putin.
This announcement comes amidst allegations that North Korea has supplied artillery shells and, according to US and Ukrainian sources, possibly ballistic missiles to aid Russia in Ukraine, with Russia purportedly reciprocating with military and satellite technology support. Both sides have denied these claims, as such actions would violate the UN arms embargo on North Korea.
Russia’s North Korean Artillery Windfall
Last week, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Wonsik reported the detection of up to 10,000 shipping containers traveling from North Korea to Russia, potentially containing up to 4.8 million artillery shells. A prior US intelligence report indicated that ‘at least 3 million’ North Korean shells had been delivered to Russia.
If confirmed, these shipments would significantly bolster Russia in its war of attrition in Ukraine, where both sides have struggled with a chronic ‘shell famine’ affecting artillery strikes. Russian diplomats will likely reassure other governments that there is no cause for concern and that Putin is merely placating Kim Jong-un with symbolic gestures. However, the specifics of any secret promises or future commitments remain unknown.
The Limits of Russia-North Korea Alliance
Nothing from Pyongyang will be a game-changer in Ukraine. General Mark Milley, then-chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that North Korea is likely to provide Soviet-era 152 mm artillery rounds. However, he expressed skepticism about their impact on the battlefield.
While some Russian military bloggers have praised North Korea’s KN-09 and KN-25 multiple-launch rocket systems, it is highly unlikely that Pyongyang will export these newly developed weapons. In return, Moscow could offer assistance in three broad areas, although one is practically unfeasible. It is not in the interest of Russia—or China, for that matter—to enhance North Korea’s nuclear delivery capabilities or to overtly violate UN sanctions.
In March 2023, Russia and China voted at the UN Security Council to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts monitoring sanctions on North Korea for another year, despite neither country fully enforcing these sanctions.
Therefore, two other forms of assistance are more likely. North Korea has acute needs for food and energy. Providing cheap or free oil, gas, and grain would help sustain the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s economy. However, Russia’s ambassador in Pyongyang has noted that Kim declined an offer of food aid at the summit.
Additionally, cooperation in space-related matters is more probable. Having failed twice to launch a military reconnaissance satellite into orbit this year, Kim Jong-un may seek Russian expertise in this area. Ironically, Moscow had been assisting South Korea’s space program until Seoul revoked the contract earlier in 2023.
While such cooperation would likely breach UN sanctions, it is far less provocative than aiding North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs.
Is Putin Using Kim to Send a Message to Seoul?
Some argue that China, Russia, and North Korea are forming a trilateral alliance targeting Taiwan, Ukraine, and South Korea, respectively. While one of these targets is fighting for survival, the others are under threat amid rising tensions and ongoing arms races. However, it is incorrect to assume that each member of this trio fully supports the others’ objectives.
Specifically, neither Putin nor Xi is likely to repeat the actions of Mao and Stalin by backing North Korea in a bloody peninsular war. The stakes are much higher today due to nuclear risks and strong commercial ties with South Korea. Despite being firmly pro-US, South Korea’s conservative President Yoon Suk-yeol has resisted Washington’s pressure to reduce South Korean semiconductor operations in China and has not directly armed Ukraine.
Nevertheless, he has visited Kyiv and signed significant arms-export deals with Poland. Russian sources suggest that Putin invited Kim partly to send a warning to Yoon. Given China’s role as North Korea’s economic lifeline, Xi may not have appreciated Kim’s first post-pandemic foreign trip to Russia instead of China or his statement that relations with Russia are his ‘top priority’.
Outlook
Pyongyang has announced plans to attempt another military satellite launch after two failed attempts earlier in 2023. Should this attempt also fail, Kim might consider accepting Putin’s offer of assistance. However, a successful launch could lead North Korea to continue its independent efforts.
Kim’s decision in this regard will be a key indicator of the depth of cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang. Further insights are expected during Putin’s upcoming visit to Pyongyang, where despite the likely grand rhetoric, tangible joint projects may remain elusive.
Meanwhile, China will continue to be the dominant external influence in Pyongyang, a position it has secured through its nuanced strategy on the Korean Peninsula, a strategy it is expected to maintain. Xi Jinping is unlikely to support Sergey Lavrov’s proposal for trilateral security talks, and the possibility of joint naval maneuvers suggested by Sergey Shoigu seems remote.
Even if such maneuvers occur, they would not constitute a triple alliance or rival the increasing military and strategic cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States.
In wrapping up Putin’s unexpected visit to North Korea, the signing of a new strategic partnership agreement with Pyongyang marks a significant geopolitical move amid ongoing global scrutiny. As accusations swirl about North Korea’s support for Russia in Ukraine, the alliance’s real impact remains uncertain.
While the artillery shipments could aid Russia tactically, their strategic influence remains in question. As Putin and Kim Jong-un exchange symbolic gestures, the true extent of their alliance and its implications on regional dynamics, especially concerning South Korea and beyond, will undoubtedly unfold with time.
